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Book review

Truth or Economics: On the Definition,
Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency,
Richard S. Markovits. Yale University Press, New
Haven (2008). x+507 pp.
The author introduces his monograph by noting
in the first p aragraph t hat ( p. 1 ): “ This b ook i s a
constructive critique of the way in which economists
and law and economics scholars define, predict,
and assess the moral and legal relevance of the
impact of private choices or government policies
on economic efficiency”. E fficiency of an y kind
is a slippery concept. What the author deals with
is summarized in the concluding chapter (p. 421):
“The book’s three parts respectively address the
following three issues: the correct way to define
the impact of a choice or policy on economic
(allocative) efficiency, t he most-allocatively-efficient
way to assess the allocative efficiency o f a choice
or policy, and the connection between allocativeefficiency c onclusions a nd p rescriptive-moral and
legal conclusions”. These two sentences, which are
among the easier parts of this highly specialized
book for a lay economist to grasp, serve to illustrate
the dense, highly technical nature of the author’s
arguments. Serious welfare economists are unlikely to
find a better organized or more persuasive presentation
on measuring the impact of a policy change on
individual or group welfare. And only serious-minded
welfare economists will persevere through all 436
pages of text, containing many in-excess-of-fifty word
compound-adjective sentences. (There are another 50
pages of endnotes.)
The title of this book suggests a dichotomy: truthseekers and economists are two different animals. This
is indeed the author’s intent. At least as far as welfare

economists are concerned, the author maintains that in
measuring the impacts of a policy, they use approaches
they know to be wrong. The subtitle conveys a
partly correct impression. There are some 50 pages
on the definitions of allocative efficiency, and a
fair amount on relevance from a philosophical and
legal standpoint. One must look hard for anything
on prediction, or at least anything that a forecaster
would consider germane. The bulk of the book, a
chapter of almost 200 pages, is on the measurement of
allocative efficiency, particularly in the typical context
of second-best situations. Faced with an unavoidable
market failure in one part of the economy – for
example, a monopoly – should we attempt to attain
perfect competition in the rest of the economy – a next
best solution? We already have the answer: under the
general theory of the second best, achieving perfect
competition in the rest of the economy is not, in
general, the most desirable response to market failure.
The author finds two attitudes among economists:
those who know the theory of the second best but
choose to ignore it in their analyses, and those who do
not know the theory of the second best and don’t care.
The book is a manifesto to show both groups why they
should care and how they can amend their analyses.
And finding the second-best solution in a typical
economy with many market failures is both difficult
and time consuming. In the chapter, the author lays
out an approach for dealing with distortions caused by
market failure to arrive at a third-best solution, rather
than the impossible-to-achieve second-best solution.
That is, since the complete analysis takes too much
time and resources (like labor), make a judgment about
how much time and resources are worth devoting to
analyzing the effect of a policy, then calculate the
distortion-reducing impacts of the policy to the extent
that it is judged worthwhile — a partial analysis.

Most economists will readily accept the author’s
fundamental contention, that the correct way of
measuring welfare changes is through equivalent
variation. Having got that far, most will probably
fall back on the Willig (1976) defense. Willig argued
that although consumers’ surplus, compensating and
equivalent variation are all different values, for most
practical situations the difference among them is
small. He may not have said so explicitly, but
his implication was that the errors in measuring
variables, choosing an appropriate functional form
and estimating parameters will matter more than the
correct choice of welfare measure. Forecasters should
readily appreciate Willig’s argument.
Markovits’ book, if incorrect in detail, is surely
a methodological improvement. Concerning policy
analysis, he provides numerous arguments as to why
the standard Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, Scitovsky and
potential Pareto measures of a welfare change are
inadequate. He quotes seven or eight arguments used
by economists for ignoring second-best considerations
and provides several counters to each. With a lawyer’s
skill, Markovits has marshaled his arguments as to
what is wrong with current practice, why it is wrong
and what needs to be changed. Does he convince me
to persevere? No. The additional amount of work to
analyze a policy seems high. How different will the
results be in practice? We don’t know.
At one point (p. 70), the author admits that
the difference between compensating and equivalent
variation might be of the order of two to three percent,
and attempts to rebut those who (like me) believe that

these differences are too small to worry about. His
arguments include: small, but why not do it right?
Small, but in the context of a national policy this might
be $20 million to $30 million; small, but how can
you be sure it is as small as you say? There is no
quantitative example applied to a real-world situation.
That would be a good first step, though of course
it raises additional questions, such as, under what
conditions is the difference likely to be large enough
to matter? For that we await a latter-day Willig. But
first, the author must convince at least a handful of
economists to adopt his approach, and, as he makes
clear, he is at present a lonely pioneer.
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